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A b s t r a c t  
I n  t h i s  p a p e r ,  t h e  p rob lem o f  m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  
i n  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t s  i s  a n a l y z e d .  F o r  t h i s  p u r p o s e  a  
r e f e r e n c e  t i m e  i s  c o n s i d e r e d  which  c o n t a i n s  a s e q u e n c e  o f  
n  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s ,  i . e .  d u r i n g  t h i s  r e f e r e n c e  t i m e  a 
p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  i s  p e r f o r m e d  n  t i m e s  and compared 
w i t h  t h e  book i n v e n t o r y  a t  t h a t  t i m e .  A d e c i s i o n  
p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  i f  a l l  n e c e s s a r y  measurements  can  o n l y  
b e  p e r f o r m e d  w i t h  l i m i t e d  a c c u r a c y  a s  i n  t h i s  c a s e  one 
h a s  t o  d e c i d e  i f  a b o o k - p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e  
i s  c a u s e d  by m i s s i n g  material o r  s i m p l y  by measurement  
e r r o r s .  
I n  c a s e  i t  h a s  t o  b e  assumed t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  one  
p a r t y  which may i n t e n d  t o  d i v e r t  m a t e r i a l ,  t h e  p rob lem 
c a n  b e  f o r m u l a t e d  as a two-person  zero-sum i n s p e c t i o n  
game, t h e  p a y o f f  o f  which i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n .  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  t h e  game t h e o r e t i c a l  
model i s  e s t a b l i s h e d  and t h e  s e t s  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  b o t h  
p a r t i e s  a r e  g i v e n .  I n  t h e  s e c o n d  p a r t  t h e  s o l u t i o n s  o f  
t h e  game, i . e .  s a d d l e p o i n t s ,  a r e  a n a l y z e d :  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  i n  t h e  fo rm o f  s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s  a r e  g i v e n  
which a l s o  c a n  b e  u s e d  f o r  n u m e r i c a l  c a l c u l a t i o n s .  
* 
A s h o r t e r  v e r s i o n  o f  t h i s  p a p e r  w i l l  b e  p u b l i s h e d  i n  
a f o r t h c o m i n g  i s s u e  o f  " Z e i t s c h r i f t  f i i r  S p i - e l t h e o r i e  ." 
* * 
I n t e r n a t i o n a l  I n s t i t u t e  f o r  A p p l i e d  Sys tems  A n a l y s i s ,  
Laxenburg ,  A u s t r i a .  
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1. I n t r o d u c t i o n  
T h e r e  a r e  c a s e s  where  t h e  m a t e r i a l  t o  b e  p r o c e s s e d  by 
a n  i n d u s t r i a l  p l a n t  i s  s o  e x p e n s i v e  t h a t  i t  i s  n e c e s s a r y  t o  
p e r f o r m  a n  a c c u r a t e  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i n  o r d e r  t o  know w h e t h e r  
i n  a  g i v e n  p e r i o d  o f  t i m e  m a t e r i a l  h a s  d i s a p p e a r e d  o r  n o t .  
H e r e ,  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  means t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  s o - c a l l e d  
book i n v e n t o r y  ( i . e .  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  p l u s  r e c e i p t s  minus  
s h i p m e n t s )  o v e r  a c e r t a i n  p e r i o d  o f  t ime,  a n d  t h e  c o m p a r i s o n  
o f  t h e  book i n v e n t o r y  w i t h  t h e  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  ( i . e .  t h e  
m a t e r i a l  p h y s i c a l l y  found  i n  t h e  p l a n t )  a t  t h e  end o f  t h a t  
p e r i o d  o f  t i m e .  
The p r o b l e m  o f  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  becomes d i f f i c u l t  i n  c a s e  
t h e  measurement  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  t o  b e  a c c o u n t e d  f o r  c a n n o t  b e  
c a r r i e d  t h r o u g h  w i t h o u t  c o m m i t t i n g  measurement  e r r o r s .  I n  
t h i s  c a s e ,  when some m a t e r i a l  seems  t o  have  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  t h e  
p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  o f  d e c i d i n g  i f  i n  f a c t  some m a t e r i a l  h a s  
d i s a p p e a r e d  o r  i f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  u n a c c o u n t e d  f o r  s i m p l y  c a n  b e  
i n t e r p r e t e d  as b e i n g  c a u s e d  by measurement  e r r o r s .  
I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e r e  a r i s e s  t h e  p r o b l e m  o f  t h e  a p p r o p r i a t e  
c h o i c e  o f  t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  f o r  e a c h  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d :  
i f  i t  h a s  b e e n  d e c i d e d  a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  i n v e n t o r y  
p e r i o d  t h a t  no  m a t e r i a l  h a s  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  one c o u l d  c h o o s e  
e i t h e r  t h e  book o r  t h e  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y ,  o r  a  c o m b i n a t i o n  
o f  b o t h  as t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  n e x t  
i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d .  I n  a n y  c a s e  however ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  
s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  one g e t s  s t o c h a s t i c  dependenc ie s  between 
d i f f e r e n t  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s .  
I n  some s i t u a t i o n s ,  i t  has  t o  be assumed t h a t  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  one p a r t y  which i n t e n d s  t o  d i v e r t  m a t e r i a l .  Fu r the rmore ,  
i n  c a s e  d i f f e r e n t  modes o f  d i v e r s i o n  e x i s t ,  i t  has t o  
be assumed t h a t  t h i s  p a r t y  w i l l  s e l e c t  t h e  o p t i m a l  d i v e r s i o n  
" s t r a t egy" - -wha teve r  "opt imal"  means. 
The problem a s  i t  has been ske t ched  p l a y s  a  very  
impor t an t  r o l e  i n  t h e  n u c l e a r  m a t e r i a l  s a f e g u a r d s  developed  
i n  f u l f i l l m e n t  of  t h e  N o n - P r o l i f e r a t i o n  Trea ty  f o r  n u c l e a r '  
weapons [ll. I n  f a c t ,  t h e  a n a l y s i s  p r e s e n t e d  i n  t h i s  paper  
has  been performed on t h e  b a s i s  o f  t h i s  s p e c i f i c  problem. 
However, it  i s  obvious  t h a t  i t  can  be a p p l i e d  t o  q u i t e  
d i f f e r e n t  problems.  
I n  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  o f  t h i s  pape r ,  t h e  p r i n c i p l e  o f  
m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  i s  ske tched  and t h e  d e c i s i o n  problem 
i s  t r e a t e d  f o r  t h e  c a s e  o f  a s i n g l e  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d .  The 
problem of a sequence o f  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  i s  fo rmula t ed ,  
t h e  s e t s  of  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  i n s p e c t i o n  a u t h o r i t y  a s  w e l l  
a s  o f  t h e  p l a n t  o p e r a t o r  a s  a "would-be d i v e r t e r "  a r e  
d e s c r i b e d ,  and t h e  game t h e o r e t i c a l  problem i s  fo rmula t ed .  
I n  t h e  second p a r t ,  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  
s a d d l e p o i n t s  o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  de t ec t ion - -wh ich  p l a y s  
t h e  r o l e  o f  t h e  payof f  of a  two-person zero-sum game f o r  
s p e c i f i c  r e a s o n s - - i s  ana lyzed .  It i s  shown t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  can be  fo rmula t ed  and t h a t  t h e s e  
c o n d i t i o n s  a r e  f u l f i l l e d  by e l e m e n t s  o f  s p e c i f i c  s e t s  o f  
s t r a t e g i e s .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s  c a n  b e  u s e d  
f o r  t h e  n u m e r i c a l  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t s .  
The p a p e r  c o n c l u d e s  w i t h  g e n e r a l  r e m a r k s  on t h e  
o p t i m a l i t y  c r i t e r i a  b e i n g  u s e d ,  a n d  p o s s i b l e  e x t e n s i o n s  o f  
t h e  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s .  
2 .  The Model: Sequence of  Inven to ry  P e r i o d s  
2 . 1  One Inven to ry  Pe r iod  
Let  IO be t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  i n  a  p l a n t  ( o r  more 
g e n e r a l l y ,  i n  a  m a t e r i a l  ba l ance  a r e a )  a t  t ime  to and l e t  D l  
be t h e  sum o f  a l l  m a t e r i a l  i n p u t s  and o u t p u t s  i n  t h e  i n t e r v a l  
of  t ime  ( t O , t l ) .  Then B1: = IO + Dl i s  c a l l e d  t h e  book i n -  
ven to ry  a t  t ime t Let I be t h e  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  a t  t ime  1 ' 1 
t l .  It i s  assumed t h a t  a l l  m a t e r i a l  measurements have normally 
d i s t r i b u t e d  measurement e r r o r s  and  t h a t  t h e  v a r i a n c e s  of  
t h e s e  e r r o r s  a r e  known. 
If no m a t e r i a l  d i s a p p e a r s  i n  ( tO , t l ) ,  t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  
v a l u e  of  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  ' 
i s  z e r o  ( N u l l  h y p o t h e s i s  H , ) .  I f  t h e  amount M1 m i s s e s ,  t h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n  v a l u e  o f  MUF i s  M1 ( A l t e r n a t i v e  h y p o t h e s i s  H I ) .  
I n  t h e  formulae  
I n  o r d e r  t o  check a t  t h e  end o f  one i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  whether  
o r  no t  m a t e r i a l  ha s  d i s a p p e a r e d ,  a s i g n i f i c a n c e  t e s t  i s  p e r -  
formed. Le t  a and f3 be t h e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  o f  t h e  e r r o r s  f i r s t  
and second k i n d ,  
 h he t e rm "Material Unaccounted For"  i s  n o t  ve ry  p r e c i s e ,  
a s  a non-zero d i f f e r e n c e  between B1 and I1 may a l s o  o r  mainly 
be caused  by measurement e r r o r s ,  n o t  on ly  by mi s s ing  m a t e r i a l .  
However, i t  seems t o  be i m p o s s i b l e  t o  change t h i s .  
a l :  = p r o b  {MUF1 > x l ( H o l  , B ~ :  = p r o b  { M U F ~  5 x  J H ~  1 , 
( 2 - 3 )  
where  x  i s  t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h r e s h o l d .  One o b t a i n s  
H e r e ,  0 i s  t h e  G a u s s i a n  d i s t r i b u t i o n  f u n c t i o n ,  U i t s  i n v e r s e  
a n d  
2 
a l  : = v a r  IO + v a r  Dl + v a r  I 1 ( 2 - 4 b )  
t h e  sum o f  a l l  measurement v a r i a n c e s .  I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g ,  1-6 
i s  c a l l e d  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n ,  a n d  a i s  c a l l e d  f a l s e  
a l a r m  p r o b a b i l i t y .  
2 .2  S t a r t i n g  I n v e n t o r y  f o r  t h e  i - t h  I n v e n t o r y  P e r i o d  
A t  t h e  b e g i n n i n g  o f  t h e  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  f o r  t h e  
t i m e  i n t e r v a l  ( t i - l , t i )  t h e  p r o b l e m  a r i s e s  how t o  c h o o s e  t h e  
s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  Si-l f o r  t h i s  p e r i o d .  I n  o r d e r  t o  make 
t h e  b e s t  u s e  o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  o b t a i n e d  s o  f a r  S t e w a r t  [2] 
h a s  p r o p o s e d  t o  u s e  a n  u n b i a s e d  minimum v a r i a n c e  e s t i m a t e  
formed from t h e  book a n d  end in^ p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r i e s  o f  t h e  
f o r e g o i n g  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d :  
Theorem 2 .1 .  The u n b i a s e d  minimum v a r i a n c e  e s t i m a t e  Si-l 
f o r  t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  o f  t h e  i - t h  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  
g i v e n  by 
w h e r e  
v a r  Ii-l 
ai-l ' v a r  Bi-l t v a r  Ii-l 
The v a r i a n c e  o f  t h i s  e s t i m a t e  i s  g i v e n  by 
1 1 + 1 
v a r  Si-l  - v a r  Bi-l v a r  Ii-l 
P r o o f .  An u n b i a s e d  e s t i m a t e  f o r  t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y  i s  
g i v e n  by 
The v a r i a n c e  of t h i s  e s t i m a t e  i s  
- % 2  % 
v a r  5i-1 - ai-l v a r  Bi-l + (1 - a i - l ) 2  v a r  Ii-l . 
% The v a l u e  of ai-l which  m i n i m i z e s  v a r  5i-l i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by 
t h e  e q u a t i o n  
A s  c a n  b e  s e e n  e a s i l y  t h e  v a r i a n c e  of t h i s  e s t i m a t e  i s  s m a l l e r  
t h a n  b o t h  t h e  v a r i a n c e s  o f  t h e  e n d i n g  book a n d  p h y s i c a l  i n -  
v e n t o r i e s  o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d .  
It s h o u l d  b e  n o t e d  t h a t  t h i s  e s t i m a t e  i s  n o t  n e c e s s a r i l y  
t h e  b e s t  e s t i m a t e  f rom t h e  p o i n t  o f  v iew o f  d e t e c t i n g  m i s s i n g  
m a t e r i a l ,  s e e  e . g .  Ref .  [ 3 ] .  
The e s t i m a t e  a s  g i v e n  a b o v e  however ,  h a s  a f u r t h e r  p r o p -  
e r t y  w h i c h  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  f o l l o w i n g :  
Theorem 2 . 2 .  I f  f o r  e v e r y  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  t h e  s t a r t i n g  
i n v e n t o r y  i s  c h o s e n  a s  d e s c r i b e d  i n  Theorem 2 . 1 ,  t h e n  t h e  
b o o k - p n y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n v e n t o r y  
p e r i o d s  a r e  u n c o r r e l a t e d .  
P r o o f .  The b o o k - p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e  f o r  t h e  j - t h  
i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  g i v e n  by  
L e t  b e  j > i. Then S j - l  c a n  b e  w r i t t e n  as 
where  t h e  c ~ - ~  t e r m  i n v o l v e s  1 ' s  a n d  B ' s  w i t h  s u b s c r i p t s  
l a r g e r  t h a n  i, a n d  b j - l  ' i n v o l v e s  o n l y  c o n s t a n t s .  Then 
. 
- 
- - b j - l  [ai v a r  Ii - (1 - a i )  
v a r  (Si-l  + D i - l ) ]  . 
Use of  eq .  (2 -7 )  comple tes  t h e  p r o o f .  
A s  i t  has  been assumed i n  t h e  beg inn ing  t h a t  a l l  measure- 
ment e r r o r s  a r e  normal ly  d i s t r i b u t e d ,  it  f o l l o w s  from Theorem 
2.2 t h a t  t h e  book-phys ica l  i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e s  o f  d i f f e r e n t  
i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  a r e  independent .  
According t o  t h e  cho ice  o f  t h e  s t a r t i n g  i n v e n t o r y ,  t h e  
e x p e c t a t i o n  v a l u e  o f  t h e  book-phys ica l  i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e  
a t  t h e  end o f  an i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  no t  s imply  g iven  by t h e  
amounts o f  m a t e r i a l  d i s a p p e a r i n g  i n  t h e s e  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s :  
Theorem 2 . 3 .  Under t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  i n  t h e  j - t h  i n v e n t o r y  
- 
p e r i o d  ( j  = l . . . i )  t h e  amount M d i s a p p e a r s  ( A l t e r n a t i v e  j 
h y p o t h e s i s  H,) t h e  e x p e c t a t i o n  v a l u e  of t h e  book p h y s i c a l  
i n v e n t o r y  d i f f e r e n c e  o f  t h e  i - t h  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  i s  
determined  by t h e  r e c u r s i v e  r e l a t i o n  
P r o o f .  I f  one d e f i n e s  
one h a s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  assumpt ion  
The re fo re ,  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h e  a b b r e v i a t i o n  
w i l l  be used.  Then one has  i n s t e a d  o f  (2-8)  
o r  i n  m a t r i x  l anguage ,  
t y , .  . . , = A (Ml,. . ¶ M n )  9 
where A :  = { a i j }  and 
I O f o r  j > i 
f o r  j = i 
f o r  j < i .  
Let us  c o n s i d e r  a  r e f e r e n c e  t ime  i n t e r v a l  (0 ,T )  c o n t a i n i n g  
n  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s .  Then t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t o  d e t e c t  miss in^ 
m a t e r i a l  i n  c a s e  t h e  amount Mi i s  m i s s i n g  i n  t h e  i - t h  i n v e n t o r y  
p e r i o d  i s  g iven  by 
1 - f3 = 1 - prob  {MUF1 - < xlA ... AMUFn 2 x , ( H ~ )  . (2-10) 
According t o  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  one o b t a i n s  
where  y i  i s  g i v e n  by e q u a t i o n  ( 2 - 8 ' ) ,  where  ai i s  t h e  f a l s e  
2  a l a r m  p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  t h e  i - t h  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d ,  a n d  where  ai 
i s  g i v e n  by 
2  
= v a r  Si-l + v a r  Di + v a r  Ii . 
The r e s u l t i n g  f a l s e  alarm p r o b a b i l i t y  a i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  
2 . 3  S t r a t e g i e s ,  Two-person Zero-sum I n s p e c t i o n  Game 
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e  o f  o p t i m i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  m a t e r i a l  a c -  
c o u n t a b i l i t y  p r o c e d u r e  as d e s c r i b e d  a b o v e  two b o u n d a r y  c o n d i t i o n s  
h a v e  t o  b e  a g r e e d .  It i s  assumed i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  t h a t  
( i )  t h e  r e s u l t i n g  f a l s e  a l a r m  p r o b a b i l i t y  a i s  f i x e d ,  a n d  
( i i )  t h e  " s e n s i t i v e "  amount o f  m i s s i n g  m a t e r i a l  i s  e i t h e r  
n  - - 
z e r o  o r  M = 1 M, and  f i x e d .  
i=l 
I n  o r d e r  t o  d e t e r m i n e  t h e  o p t i m a l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n  
w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  a l l  p o s s i b l e  l l s t r a t e g i e s ' l  
one  h a s  t o  t a k e  i n t o  a c c o u n t  a l l  p o s s i b l e  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  t h e  
a d v e r s a r y  p a r t y  
Note:  I n  t h e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  S2 t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  i s  i n c l u d e d  
-
t h a t  i n  some i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  t h e r e  i s  more m a t e r i a l  t h a n  
accounted  f o r .  I n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n  o f  t h e  nex t  c h a p t e r  t h e  
s p e c i a l  c a s e  Mi 2 0 ,  i = l . . . n  i s  c o n s i d e r e d .  
According t o  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  t h e  op t ima l  
gua ran t eed  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  d e t e c t i o n  i s  g i v e n  by 
n  
1 - min ma x l-/- @ ( U ( l  - c i i )  - -) 'i
0 i 
a19** . sc i  n  M n  i=l 
It shou ld  be mentioned t h a t  t h i s  o p t i m i z a t i o n  problem had t o  
be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  c o u r s e  o f  t h e  e s t a b l i s h m e n t  o f  t h e  n u c l e a r  
m a t e r i a l  s a f e g u a r d s  sys tem o f  t h e  I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Atomic Energy 
Agency i n  f u l f i l l m e n t  o f  t h e  r equ i r emen t s  o f  t h e  N o n - P r o l i f e r a -  
t i o n  T r e a t y .  There ,  i t  had t o  be assumed t h a t  i n  c a s e  a 
d i v e r s i o n  was p lanned  i t  was planned  i n  t h e  most e f f e c t i v e  way. 
The v a l u e  o f  t h e  f a l s e  a l a rm p r o b a b i l i t y  f o r  a r e f e r e n c e  p e r i o d  
o f  t i m e  had t o  be not  l a r g e r  t han  a g iven  v a l u e  f o r  p o l i t i c a l  
r e a s o n s .  The v a l u e  o f  t h e  s e n s i t i v e  amount o f  m a t e r i a l  was 
a g r e e d  t o  be n o t  s m a l l e r  t h a n  a g iven  v a l u e  i n  t h a t  s p e c i f i c  
c o n n e c t i o n .  A two-person zero-sum game was c o n s t r u c t e d  w i t h  
t h e  s e t s  o f  s t r a t e g i e s  as given  above and w i t h  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
payof f  t o  t h e  o p e r a t o r  
0 i n  c a s e  o f  no d i v e r s i o n  and  no  f a l s e  a l a r m  
0 i n  c a s e  o f  a  f a l s e  a l a r m  (which  was e x p e c t e d  t o  be 
i d e n t i f i e d  a s  a  f a l s e  a l a r m  i n  a  s econd  a c t i o n  l e v e l )  
-c i n  c a s e  o f  d e t e c t e d  d i v e r s i o n  
d  i n  c a s e  o f  n o t  d e t e c t e d  d i v e r s i o n .  
T h e r e f o r e  t h e  e x p e c t e d  g a i n  a  o f  t h e  o p e r a t o r  i s  
( O  i n  c a s e  o f  no d i v e r s i o n  
a  = 
1-c ( 1 - B )  + d  B i n  c a s e  o f  d i v e r s i o n  . 
A s  t h e  game (S1,S2,a) i s  s t r a t e g i c a l l y  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  
game (S1,S2,B) i n  t h e  s e n s e  t h a t  t h e  o p t i m a l  s t r a t e g i e s  o f  
b o t h  games a r e  t h e  same on ly  t h e  l a t t e r  one was c o n s i d e r e d  a s  
a )  i t  was n o t  p o s s i b l e  t o  a g r e e  on v a l u e s  f o r  t h e  p a y o f f  
p a r a m e t e r s  a n d  b )  on ly  t h e  o p e r a t i o n a l  s t r a t e g i e s ,  n o t  t h e  
v a l u e  o f  t h e  game, were i n t e r e s t i n g .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  g e n e r a l  p rob lem o f  t h e  o p t i m a l  c h o i c e  o f  
t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  t h r e s h o l d s  l e a d s  t o  t h e  problem o f  t h e  s o l u -  
t i o n  o f  t h e  two-person  zero-sum game ( S  S , B ) .  1' 2  
3. S a d d l e p o i n t s  
3 . 1  Formula t ion  o f  t h e  Problem 
A s a d d l e p o i n t  i s  d e f i n e d  by t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
D e f i n i t i o n  3 .1 .  Let  H be a  r e a l  va lued  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  on 
t h e  nonempty s e t  C x  D .  Then ( co ,d0 )  i s  c a l l e d  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  
o f  H on C x  D i f  
h o l d s  f o r  a l l  ccC and dcD. 
For  s a d d l e p o i n t s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  theorem i s  v a l i d  ( c f .  [4] ,  
Th. 6 .29 )  
Theorem 3 .2 .  Let H be a  r e a l  va lued  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  on t h e  
nonempty s e t  C x  D. 
a )  I f  H h a s  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  ( co ,d0 )  E C x D ,  t h e n  t h e r e  
e x i s t  rnin max H(c ,d )  and max rnin ~ ( c , d )  and it  i s  
caC dcD dcD ccC 
min max H(c ,d )  = H(co,do)  = max min H(c ,d )  . (3 -2 )  
C E C   ED dcD caC 
b )  I f  ( c l , d l ) ,  ( c 2 , d 2 ) €  C x D a r e  s a d d l e p o i n t s  o f  H t h e n  
a l s o  ( c l , d 2 ) ,  ( c 2 , d l )  a r e  s a d d l e p o i n t s  o f  H on C x D .  
T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  problem fo rmula t ed  a t  t h e  end o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  
c h a p t e r  can  be fo rmula t ed  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: 
Determine t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t s  of  t h e  f u n c t i o n  B(sl ,s2) ,  
d e f i n e d  by eqs .  ( 2 - l l ) ,  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  
which i s  g iven  by t h e  C a r t e s i a n  p roduc t  S1 x  S 2 ,  e q s .  (2-13)  
and (2-14).  
I n s t e a d  o f  B( s l , s2 )  d e f i n e d  on S1 x  S2 ,  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
w i t h  t h e  r e g i o n  o f  d e f i n i t i o n  X x  Y ,  
w i l l  be c o n s i d e r e d  i n  t h e  fo l lowing .  
n - -
As t h e  c o n d i t i o n  1 Mi = M i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  c o n d i t i o n  
n- 1 i= 1 
+ 1 ( 1  - a i )  yi = M ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  lemma i s  e v i d e n t :  Yn i.1 
* * 
Lemma 3.3. I f  ( s1 , s2 )  E S1 x S2 i s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  B on 
* * * * t  
S1 x S 2 ,  t h e n  ( x  ,y ) = ( ( k n ( 1  - a l )  ,... ,En ( 1  - a n ) )  , 
* t  A (M; ,... ,Mn) ) E X x Y ,  where Pb i s  d e f i n e d  by e q .  ( 2 - 8 " ) ,  
i s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y .  
* * 
I f  on t h e  o t h e r  hand (x.y ) E X x  Y i s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F 
- - 
* + xi x n  * -1 * * t  
on X x  Y, t h e n  (s1 , s2)  = ( ( 1  - e  , . . a  ,I - e  1, A (y1 , - - - ,yn)  
E S ~  x S2 i s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  B on S1 x  S2 .  
With t h e  h e l p  o f  t h i s  lemma, t h e  problem fo rmula t ed  above 
may be fo rmula t ed  i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  way: 
Determine t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t s  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  F ( x , y )  
d e f i n e d  ')y eq .  (3-3)  t h e  r e g i o n  of  d e f i n i t i o n  of  
which i s  g i v e n  by t h e  C a r t e s i a n  p roduc t  X x Y ,  
e q s .  ( 3 - 4 ) .  
The advan tage  o f  t h i s  f o r m u l a t i o n  i s  t h a t  X x Y i s  
a  convex s e t  whereas t h i s  i s  n o t  t h e  c a s e  f o r  t h e  s e t  
S1 X S2.  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  we w i l l  p rove  t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  
s a d d l e p o i n t  of  F  on X x  Y a s  w e l l  a s  i t s  un iqueness .  For  
t h i s  purpose ,  i n  t h e  n e x t  s e c t i o n  convex i ty  and c o n c a v i t y  
p r o p e r t i e s  o f  F  a r e  d e r i v e d .  With t h e  h e l p  of  t h e s e  
p r o p e r t i e s  i n  s e c t i o n  3 . 3  we w i l l  g i v e  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n s  
f o r  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  of  F  on X x  Y and t h e n  show t h a t  t h e s e  
c o n d i t i o n s  can  always be f u l f i l l e d  by some p o i n t  o f  X x  Y .  
T h i s  way we a l s o  o b t a i n  a  s imp le  method f o r  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  
of t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t .  We w i l l  u s e  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  theorem f o r  
Lagrange m u l t i p l i e r s  ( c f .  [5]) :  
n  
Theorem 3.5.  Let  C c  be an open and convex s e t .  Let  
be a  r e a l  va lued ,  convex d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n ,  and l e t  
be a  r e a l  va lued ,  convex d i f f e r e n t i a b l e  f u n c t i o n .  
If  t h e r e  i s  a  cOeC and a  X - > 0  w i t h  
grad  G(co) + X grad  g ( c o )  = 0 
g ( c o )  = 0 
t h e n  C O  i s  a  minimum of  G on t h e  s e t  {c sC ,g (c )  = 01.  
I t  shou ld  be no ted  t h a t  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  F d e r i v e d  i n  
s e c t i o n  3 . 2  pe rmi t  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  theorem 
( c f .  Lh], ~ h .  6.3 .7 ) :  
Minimax-Theorem o f  Sion-Kakutani  3.4 
Le t  C I Z I R ~  , D € 1 ~ '  be convex compact s e t s .  Le t  
be a  r e a l  va lued  con t inuous  convex-concave f u n c t i o n  on C x  D ,  
i . e .  l e t  H ( * , d )  be a  convex f u n c t i o n  on C f o r  eve ry   ED and H ( c , - )  
be a  concave f u n c t i o n  on D f o r  e v e r y  ceC. Then H h a s  a  s a d d l e -  
p o i n t  on C x D.  
Thi s  way t h e  e x i s t e n c e  o f  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y 
can  be proven i n  a  very  s imp le  way; however, no i d e a  i s  given  
how t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  cou ld  be de termined .  
I n  t h e  l a s t  s e c t i o n ,  we w i l l  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  
problem on t h e  s p e c i a l  s e t  X x  Y '  where Y '  i s  g i v e n  by 
i . e .  t h e  c a s e  Mi , 0 f o r  i = 1, ..., n  i s  c o n s i d e r e d .  
3.2 Convexity and Concavity P r o p e r t i e s  of  F; E x i s t e n c e  o f  
S a d d l e p o i n t s  
I n  o r d e r  t o  show t h a t  F i s  convex-concave on 
X t  x : where 
( i n  f a c t  t h i s  i s  no t  t r u e  f o r  X t  x  R n ) ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  lemma 
w i l l  be used .  
Lemma 3 . 6 .  Let  Q ( x ) , x c ~ R ,  be d e f i n e d  by 
Then i t  i s  f o r  x c R  
P r o o f .  Let  R ( x ) , x E T R ,  be d e f i n e d  by 
R i s  c a l l e d  " M i l l s  ~ a t i o . "  Then one can  show ( c f .  161, o r  
[7], p .177)  t h a t  f o r  x c R  
S i n c e  Q ( x )  = 1 ~ ( - x )  , t h e  p roo f  i s  comple ted .  
F o r  t h e  p u r p o s e s  o f  s e c t i o n  3 . 3  and i n  o r d e r  t o  a p p l y  t h e  
Minimax Theorem 3 . 4 ,  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two t h e o r e m s  have  t o  b e  
e s t a b l i s h e d .  
Theorem 3 . 7 .  For  e v e r y  y~1R:  t h e  f u n c t i o n  F ( - , y )  i s  convex 
on X t  where X t  i s  g i v e n  by ( 3 . 6 ) .  
P r o o f .  We have  t o  show 
f o r  a l l  x '  f x" w i t h  x ' , x " r X t , y r ~ ~  and A c ( 0 , l ) .  With t h e  
d e f i n i t i o n  
t h i s  i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  showing  
A ( A + 1 - 0  , f o r  A r ( 0 , l )  . 
T h e r e f o r e ,  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  show t h a t  g ( t )  i s  convex i n  [0,1]. 
T h i s  w i l l  be  done by showing  t h a t  
'I 1 'I 
X i  + t ( x i  - Xi) Y i  
- a 2 t n  ~ ( u ( e  ) - q ) L O  3 f o r  t ~ ( O , l )  
a t 2  














( w i t h  s t r i c t  i n e q u a l i t y  f o r  xi * xi,yi  > O) ,  t h e  p r o o f  o f  ( 3 - 1 2 )  
and t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h e  t h e o r e m  i s  c o m p l e t e d .  I 
Theorem 3 .8 .  F o r  e v e r y  xcXt t i l e  f u n c t i o n  F ( x , *  ) i s  c o n c a v e  on Rn . 
P r o o f .  We h a v e  t o  show 
F ( x , X y 1  + ( 1  - X)y") 2 X F ( x , y t )  + ( 1  - X ) F ( x , y l ' )  
n  
f o r  a l l  y '  * y" w i t h  y ' , y " ~ ? R  , xcX, X c ( 0 , l ) .  
A s  i n  t h e  p r o o f  o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  t h e o r e m  i t  i s  s u f f i c i e n t  
t o  p r o v e  t h e  c o n c a v i t y  o f  t h e  f u n c t i o n  
Now, we h a v e  
1 
f o r  a l l  t c  [0,1] s i n c e  Q - < 0  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Lemma 3.6 .  T h e r e -  
f o r e ,  we h a v e  
a n d  f ( t )  i s  c o n c a v e  i n  [0,1] which  c o m p l e t e s  t h e  p r o o f .  I 
With t h e  h e l p  o f  t h e s e  two t h e o r e m s  we c a n  e s t a b l i s h  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  
Theorem 3.9.  Le t  X1 c  X t , Y 1  CX: be c l o s e d  convex s e t s ,  
Y1 bounded. Then F has  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  on X1 x  Y1. 
P r o o f .  X and Y1 a r e  compact convex s e t s .  F i s  convex- 1 
concave  on X1 x  Y1 because  of  Theorems 3.7 and 3.8. There- 
f o r e ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  of  Theorem 3.4 comple tes  t h e  p r o o f .  = 
3 . 3  S u f f i c i e n t  Cond i t i ons  f o r  t h e  S a d d l e p o i n t ,  Uniqueness 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  theorem a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  f o r  a 
s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y i s  e s t a b l i s h e d .  
* * o  0 0  
Theorem 3.10.  Let  ( x  ,y  )cXt xR:, where X t  a n d k :  d e n o t e  
t h e  open c o r e  of X t  andlR: r e s p e c t i v e l y ,  be a  s o l u t i o n  of 
t h e  f o l l o w i n g  two systems o f  e q u a t i o n s :  
Then ( x t , y  * )  i s  a' s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y .  
P r o o f .  L e t  u s  r e g a r d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s :  
I f  one p u t s  
* 
* + u2(eX1)  x  t * 
p =  e X1 - y ( u ( e  
* * 
o n e  s e e s  i m m e d i a t e l y  t h a t  ( x  ,y  ) and  p s o l v e  s y s t e m  (3-17)  
* * * 
s i n c e  ( x  ,y  ) s o l v e s  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 6 ) .  S i n c e  xl < 0 i t  i s  
i Y i  Q(U(e - -) > 0 by d e f i n i t i o n  o f  Q,  h e n c e  p > 0 .  From 
0 1 
I 
s y s t e m  (3-17)  f o l l o w s  f o r  a l l  i = 1,. . . , n  
. * 
* * 
T h u s ,  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 8 )  i s  s o l v e d  by ( x  , y  ) a n d  X - > 0 i f  t h e  
f o l l o w i n g  s y s t e m  o f  e q u a t i o n s  
* 
i s  so lved  by x and X - > 0 .  T h i s  can be s een  however, from 
sys tem (3-15) by p u t t i n g  * 
* * 
H a v i n ~  shown t h a t  (x  ,y ) and P - > O , X  - > 0 s o l v e  s;lstems (3-17) 
and (3-181, we can  apply  Theorem 3 .5 .  F o r  t h i s  purpose we d e f i n e  
* n S ince  y E W+, G l  i s  convex on Xt by Theorem 3 .7 .  Fur thermore .  
* * 
sin:e ( x  ,y ) s o l v e s  sys tem (3-17) w i th  P 2 0 ,  from Theorem 
* 0 
3.5  i t  fo l l ows  t h a t  x  i s  a  minimum of  G1 on Xtn X .  Because o f  
* 
t h e  c o n t i n u i t y  of  F ( - , y  ) on Xt one t h e r e f o r e  o b t a i n s  
* * 
~ ( x  ,y 2 ~ ( x , y * )  f o r  xcx t n x  = x . (3-21 
Let  us now d e f i n e  
s i n c e  - ~ ( x * , . )  i s  convex on R* b e c a u s e  o f  Tneorem 3.8  and  
* * 
s i n c e  ( x  ,y ) '  s o l v e s  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 8 )  w i t h  X > 0 ,  it  f o l l o w s  f rom 
Theorem 3 . 5  t h a t  * i s  a  mininum o f  G2 on lRnc) y ,  t h e r e f o r e  
A c c o r d i n g  t o  d e f i n i t i o n  3 . 1  one  s e e s  from ( 3 - 2 1 )  and  ( 3 - 2 2 )  
* * 
t h a t  ( x  ,y ) i s  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y. 
With t h e  h ~ i p  o f  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  Lemma 3 . 1 1  we s h a l l  p r o v e  
Theoren  3 . 1 2  which s t a t e s  t h a t  t h e  s y s t e m  of  e q u a t i o n s  (3 -15)  
0 
and ( 3 - l i )  c a n  b c  s o l v e d  i n  ; x  R:. t 
Lemma 3 . 1 1  . Let  h l ,  . . . , h  be c o n t i n u o u s  and  s t r i c t . 1 ~  n  
monotonous i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n e d  on [o,'=) w i t h  
l i m  h i ( x )  = '= f o r  i = l , . . . ,n  . 
X--+'= 
and  l e t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s y s t e m  o f  e q u a t i o n s  b e  g i v e n :  
n  
6 j x j  = C , 6 .  J > 0  f o r  j = 1 ,..., n  . (3-23b 
j=1 
L e t  xi = 0 f o r  i = 1, ..., n  b e  a  s o l u t i o n  o f  t h e  homogeneous 
fo rm ( i . e .  C = 0 )  o f  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 2 3 ) .  Then f o r  e v e r y  C > 0  t h e r e  
e x i s t s  a  u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  xi > 0  f o r  i = l , . . . , n  o f  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 2 3 ) .  
Proof .  Let us d e f i n e  
- 1 g i :  = hi 0 hi-l f o r  i = 2 ,  ..., n ,  ( 3-24 
- 1 
where hi d e n o t e s  t h e  i n v e r s e  o f  hi.  From t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  of  
t h e  hi i t  fo l l ows  t h a t  t h e  gi a r e  con t inuous  and s t r i c t l y  
monotonous i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n s  d e f i n e d  on [ o , w )  w i t h  
l i m  g i ( x )  = f o r  i = 2 , .  . . , n  , 
X--) OJ 
and f u r t h e r m o r e ,  because o f  t h e  assumpt ion  t h a t  xi = 0  f o r  
i = 1, ..., n  s o l v e  t h e  homoqeneous sys tem (3-23) 
g i ( 0 )  = 0  f o r  i = 2, .  . . , n  . 
E v i d e n t l y  f o r  eve ry  E [ o , - ) ,  i = 2  ,..., n  t h e  sys tem 
x i  = xi f o r  i = 2 ,  ..., n ,  ( 3-25) 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  t h e  system (3 -23a ) .  
Let us  d e f i n e  now 
f i :  = gi o -- 0 g 2  f o r  i = 2, ..., n  . 
From t h e  p r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  gi it  f o l l o w s  t h a t  t h e  f i  a r e  con- 
t i n u o u s  and s t r i c t l y  monotonous i n c r e a s i n g  on [o,-) w i t h  
f i ( 0 )  = 0  and  l i m  f i ( x )  = m f o r  i = 2 , .  . . , n  . 
X->m 
E v i d e n t l y  f o r  e v e r y  xic[O,m) t h e  s y s t e m  
f . ( x l )  1 = xi f o r  i = 2 ,  ..., n  , (3-26 ) 
i s  e q u i v a l e n t  t o  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 2 5 )  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  t o  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 2 3 a ) .  
n  
S i n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  1 6 i f i (x1)  i s  a c o n t i n u o u s  and  s t r i c t l y  
i = 2  
monotonous  i n c r e a s i n g  f u n c t i o n  on [0,m) w i t h  
by r e a s o n s  o f  c o n t i r ~ u i t y  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a  u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  x  1 > O  
o f  t n e  e q u a t i o n  
f o r  e v e r y  c  > 3 a n d  t h e r e f o r e ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a u n i q u e  s o l u t i o n  
o f  t h e  s y s t e m  (3 -26)  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  (3 -23b)  which  c o m p l e t e s  
t h e  p r o o f .  I 
* * O  0 
Theorem 3 . 1 2 .  F h a s  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  ( x  , y  S EX^ xm: on X x  Y wh ich  
s o l v e s  t h e  s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s  ( 3 - 1 5 )  and  ( 3 - 1 6 ) .  
P r o o f .  L e t  u s  r e g a r d  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 5 )  which  we w r i t e  w i t h  
z i :  = -X i n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  fo rm:  i 
- z  
u 2 ( e  i ,  2  -z i-1) 
z i - 2  z  - u ( e  
e i-1 T
= 0 f o r  i = 2 , .  . . ,n-1 , 
ui (1 - zi )  u i - l  (1 - a i - l )  
Le t  u s  d e f i n e  
- z .  
h i ( z i ) :  = f o r  i = 2 , .  .. , n - 1 ,  
a i ( l  - a i )  
h i ( 0 ) :  = 0  f o r  i = 1, ..., n ,  
6 i :  = 1 f o r  i = 1, ..., n ,  
S i n c e  t h e  f u n c t i o n  z  - $ u2(e- ' )  i s  s t r i c t l y  monotonous i n -  
c r e a s i n g  on LO,-) and s i n c e  
( b o t h  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  proven  i n  t h e  append ix )  i t  f o l l o w s  t h a t  
t h e  hi a r e  s t r i c t l y  monotonous i n c r e a s i n g  on [o,-) w i t h  
l i m  h i ( z )  = - f o r  i = 1, ..., n . 
z+- 
T h e r e f o r e ,  a s  t r i v i a l l y  zi  = 0 f o r  i = 1,. . . , n  s o l v e s  t h e  
homogeneous s y s t e m ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Lemma 3 . 1 1  i m m e d i a t e l y  
* 
g i v e s  t n e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t s  a s e t  z > 0 f o r  i = l , . . . , n  i 
* * 
which  s o l v e s  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 5 ' ) .  Hence xi:  = - z  i' i = l , . .  . , n  
s o l v e s  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 5 ) .  
* 
I t  r e m a i n s  t o  b e  shown t h a t  xi > E n ( 1  - a )  f o r  i = l , . . . , n .  
* 
l iowever ,  t h i s  i s  e v i d e n t  as t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  xi < E n ( 1  - a ) ,  
* 
e q u i v a l e n t  w i t h  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  z  > -En (1 - a ) ,  t o g e t h e r  i 
w i t h  z: > 0 would l e a d  t o  t h e  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  I z *  > -En (1 - a ) .  1 i = 1 i 
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  now s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 6 ) .  We d e f i n e  
d i :  = 1 - a i  f o r  i = 1, ..., n  , 
B e c a u s e  o f  Lemma 3 . 6  t h e  hi  a r e  s t r i c t l y  monotonous  i n c r e a s i n F  
o n  [0,m). A s  p r o v e n  i n  t h e  a p p e n d i x ,  i t  i s  
h e n c e ,  s i n c e  U(e X i )  < m f o r  x i  < 0 ,  w e  have  
l i m  h i ( y )  = f o r  i = 1, ..., n  . 
Y-+" 
. , 
F u r t h e r m o r e ,  i t  i s  * 
* 2 Xi) 
+ U ( e  * 
h i ( 0 )  = e X i  2 - ~ ( u ( e  
fi 
Hence,  yi  = 0 f o r  i = 1, ..., n  s o l v e s  t h e  homogeneous form o f  
s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 6 ) .  T h e r e f o r e ,  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  Lemma 3 . 1 1  g i v e s  
* * 
t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  t h e r e  e x i s t  ,vi: Y i  > 0 f o r  i = I ,  .... n  which 
* * * * * * 
s o l v e  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 1 6 ) .  A s  x : = ( x l  ,... , x n )  and y  : = ( y l  ,..., y n )  
* * 
f u l f i l l  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  o f  Theorem 3 . 1 0 ,  (x ,y  ) i s  a  s a d d l e -  
p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y .  
Theorem 3.13.  F h a s  a  u n i q u e l y  d e t e r m i n e d  s a d d l e p o i n t  on 
X x Y .  
P r o o f .  Because  o f  Theorem 3 . 1 2  o n l y  t h e  u n i q u e n e s s  o f  t h e  
* * 
s a d d l e p o i n t  r e m a i n s  t o  be  shown. L e t  ( x  ,y )EX x Y be  t h e  
s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F a c c o r d i n g  t o  Theorem 3 . 1 0 ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  
I 1  
y > 0 f o r  i = 1 , n  L e t  ( X  ,y  ) E X  x Y b e  a n o t h e r  s a d d l e -  
t * 
p o i n t  o f  F. Because  o f  Theorem 3 . 2  ( x  ,y ) i s  a  s a d d l e p o i n t  
o f  F ,  t o o .  S i n c e  y * r ~ :  i s  convex on X t h e r e f o r e ,  
O b v i o u s l y  e q u a l i t y  must h o l d .  T h i s  i m p l i e s  
* 
But as yi  > 0 f o r  i = 1, ..., n  b e c a u s e  o f  ( 3 - 1 3 )  t h i s  c a n  be  
I * 1 * 
t h e  c a s e  o n l y  i f  xi = xi f o r  i = 1 ,..., n  h e n c e ,  x  = x . 
* 1 
Because  of  Theorem 3 .2  ( x  ,y ) i s  a  s a d d l e ~ d i n t  o f  F, t o o .  
* 
T h e r e f o r e ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o n c a v i t y  o f  F ( x  , * )  on Y we h a v e  
S i n c e  e q u a l i t y  must  ho ld  we have  
X 
S i n c e  U(e i ,  < m f o r  x* < 0 ,  b e c a u s e  o f  Lemma 3 .6  we h a v e  i 
* 1 
and t h e r e f o r e ,  y i  - yi = 0  f o r  i = 1, ..., n  wilich c o m p l e t e s  t h e  
p r o o f .  
A 3  i t  can  be  s e e n  e a s i l y  f rom Theorem 3.12 t h e  x - c o o r d i n a t e  
o f  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  depends  o n l y  on a b u t  n o t  o n  M w h e r e a s  t h e  
y - c o o r d i n a t e  depends  on b o t h  a and M .  T h i s  p r o p e r t y  o f  t h e  
s a d d l e p o i n t  i s  i m p o r t a n t  f o r  t h e  a p p l i c a t i o n s .  Theorem 3.12 
and  Le,mma 3 . 1 1  p r o v i d e  a ,  s i m p l e  method f o r  t h e  n u m e r i c a l  ca l -  
c u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t .  Because  o f  Theorem 3.12 we have  
t o  s o l v e  o n l y  two s y s t e m s  o f  e q u a t i o n s  o f  t h e  t y p e  u s e d  i n  
* 
Lemma 3 .11 .  L e t  x  b e  t h e  s o l u t i o n  o f  s y s t e m  ( 3 - 2 3 ) .  Because  
* ( 1 ) .  
o f  Lemma ( 3 . 1 1 )  we have  xlE(O,C) f o r  C > 0.  We d e f i n e  xL . = 0  
and x i 1 ) :  = C and  c h o o s e  
( 1  Then t h e  xi , i = 2 ,  ..., n  are c a l c u l a t e d  by c o n s e c u t i v e l y  
s o l v i n g  t h e  e q u a t i o n s  
n  n  
I r  1 a i x j l )  > c we p u t  x ( * )  = x i 1 ) ,  i f  1 6ix:1) < c we p u t  
i = 1 R i = 1 
x = and  s ta r t  t h e  a l a o r i t h m  a g a i n  : i t h  L 
I t  c a n  be  s e e n  e a s i l y  t h a t  I X ( ~ ' I  * c o n v e r g e s  t o  x  . 
3 . 4  T r e a t m e n t  o f  a  S p e c i a l  Case 
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n f ?  we w i l l  a n a l y z e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a  
1 I 
s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x Y where  Y had  been  g i v e n  by ( 3 5 ) :  
i . e .  t h e  c a s e  Mi 2 0 f o r  i = 1, ..., n  ( s e e  e q s .  ( 2 - 8 ) ) .  A s  
Y '  i s  convex ,  c l o s e d  and b o u n d e d ,  F h a s  a c c o r d i n g  t o  Theorem 3.9 
I I 
a s a d d l e p o i n t  ( x  ,y  ) on X x Y '  . A S  y i  > 0 f o r  i = 1.. . . , n  
must  h o l d  which can  e a s i l y  b e  s e e n ,  one c a n  show 
w i t h  t h e  same a r g u m e n t s  a s  u s e d  i n  t h e  p r o o f  o f  Theorem 3 .13  
I I 
t h a t  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  ( x  , y  ) i s  u n i q u e .  I f  f o r  t h e  s a d d l e p o i n t  
* * I * I ( x  ,y ) o f  F on X x  Y h o l d s  y E Y  t h e n  e v i d e n t l y  one  h a s  
1 1  * * I 
( X  , Y  = ( X  , Y  1. S i n c e  Y 2 Y , t h i s  must  n o t  b e  t h e  c a s e ,  
4 
i n  f a c t ,  t h e r e  a r e  c o u n t e r - e i a m p l e s .  
I n  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  we w i l l  e s t a b l i s l i  a  s u f f i c i e n t  c o n d i t i o n  
* f 
f o r  y t o  be a n  e l e m e n t  o f  Y ; t h u s ,  i n  c a s e  t h i s  c o n d i t i o n  
* * I 
i s  f u l f i l l e d  ( x  ,y ) i s  a s a d d l e p o i n t  o f  F on X x  Y . 
Theorem 3 . 1 4 .  L e t  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  i n e q u a l i t i e s  b e  f u l f i l l e d :  
( 1  1 - a  a  1 - a  f o r  i = 2  ,..., n  , 
2 'i-1 ( 1  - an- l )  , 
'i 1. a i - l  a .  1-1 f o r  i = 2 ,  ..., n  . ( i i )  
* I 
Then i t  i s  y EY . 
* I 
P r o o f .  L o t  us assume y BY . Then, u s i n g  eq. ( 2 - 8 1 ,  t h e r e  e x i s t s  
* 
a n  i n d e x  i > 1 w i t h  Mi < 0. Because  o f  Theorem 3.12 9;-1 
* * * 
and  y  = Pi + ai-l Y i - l  f u l f i l l  t h e  e q u a t i o n  1 * * 
* I 
S i n c e  M < 0 and Q < 9 (Lemma 3 . 6 )  rre have  
i *  
* 
Because  o f  a s s u m p t i o n  ( i )  and  yi-l > 0 we have  
* * 
S i n c e  and  xi s o l v e  t h e  e q u a t i o n  
we h a v e  
1 2  x  b e c a u s e  o f  a s s u m p t i o n  ( i i )  a n d  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  -x  - - U ( e  ) i s  
2  
s t r i c t l y  m o n o t o n o r ~ s l y  d e c r e a s i n g  on  (-m,O) which i s  n r o v e n  i n  
t h e  a p p e n d i x .  
However, as t h e  f u n c t i o n  
i s  m o n o t o n o u s l y  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  y  s i n c e  Q < 0 a n d  as i t  i s  
m o n o t o n o u s l y  i n c r e a s i n g  i n  x  ( s e e  3 - 1 3 ) ,  i n e q u a l i t i e s  ( 3 - 2 7 )  
and  ( 3 - 2 8 )  y i e l d  a c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t o  i n e q u a l i t y  ( 3 - 2 6 ) .  T n e r e -  
f o r e ,  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  y * + ~  i s  wrong.  
L e t  u s  c o n s i d e r  t h e  s p e c i a l  c a s e  
v a r  Ii = o: f o r  i = O , l ,  ..., n  and  v a r  D = u2 f o r  i = l , . . . , n  . i D 
Then f o r  n  = 2 t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  f o r  Theorem 3.14 are f u l f i l l e d  
as w i t h  ( 2 - l l b )  and  ( 2 - 5 )  we h a v e  
(5 > u  2 -  1 ( 1  - al l  a n d  a 2  1. a l  . al 
For  n  > 2  however, t h e  assumpt ions  f o r  Theorem 3.14 a r e  n o t  
f u l f i l l e d :  a s  we have 
assumpt ion  ( i )  of  Theorem 3.14 i s  no t  f u l f i l l e d  i f  a2  < al .  
Now we have a c c o r d i n g  t o  eq.  (2-6)  
- v a r  S1 < a  2 I '  
There f o r e  
4 .  C o n c l u d i n g  Remark 
The m a t e r i a l  a c c o u n t a b i l i t y  p rob lem t r e a t e d  i n  t h i s  
p a p e r  h a s  been  f o r m u l a t e d  a s  a  two-person  zero-sum i n s p e c t i o n  
game, t h e  p a y o f f  o f  which was t h e  o v e r a l l  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
d e t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  s e q u e n c e  o f  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  u n d e r  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n .  T h i s  may b e  c o n s i d e r e d  t o  b e  c o n s i s t e n t  
w i t h  t h e  i n t u i t i v e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  o p t i m i z a t i o n  t h a t  any 
d i s a p p e a r a n c e  o r  d i v e r s i ~ n  o f  even  s m a l l  amounts  o f  m a t e r i a l  
s h o u l d  b e  d e t e c t e d  w i t h  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n  as  h i g h  
a s  p o s s i b l e .  
T h e r e  i s ,  however ,  a n o t h e r  c r i t e r o n :  any d i s a p p e a r a n c e  
o r  d i v e r s i o n  o f  m a t e r i a l  s h o u l d  be  d e t e c t e d  a s  e a r l y  a s  
p o s s i b l e .  A s  i n  t h e  framework o f  o u r  model  t h e  d e t e c t i o n  
t i m e  i s  d e t e r m i n e d  by t h e  l e n g t h  o f  a n  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d - -  
o n l y  a t  t h e  end o f  a n  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d  c a n  a  s t a t e m e n t  b e  
made. A c c o r d i n g  t o  t h e  second  c r i t e r i o n  one  would l i k e  t o  
h a v e  t h e  g r e a t e s t  p o s s i b l e  number o f  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  p e r  
r e f e r e n c e  t i m e .  
I t  i s  c l e a r  t h a t  f o r  e c o n o m i c a l  r e a s o n s  o n l y  a  l i m i t e d  
number o f  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r i e s  c a n  b e  p e r f o r m e d  p e r  r e f e r e n c e  
t i m e .  I n  f a c t ,  i n  n u c l e a r  f a b r i c a t i o n  a n d  r e p r o c e s s i n g  p l a n t s  
n o t  more t h a n  two t o  f o u r  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r i e s  w i l l  b e  
p e r f o r m e d  f o r  s a f e g u a r d s  p u r p o s e s .  However, a p a r t  from t h e  
e c o n o m i c a l  p o i n t  o f  v iew,  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  e a r l y  d e t e c t i o n - -  
i . e .  l a r g e  number o f  i n v e n t o r y  p e r i o d s  p e r  r e f e r e n c e  t ime- -  
may c o n f l i c t  w i t h  t h e  c r i t e r i o n  o f  h i g h  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
d e t e c t i o n  f o r  t h e  r e f e r e n c e  t i m e .  T h e r e  a r e  c a s e s  where  a n  
i n c r e a s i n g  number o f  p h y s i c a l  i n v e n t o r i e s  l e a d s  t o  a  d e c r e a s e  
o f  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  d e t e c t i o n ;  t h e  q u e s t i o n  o f  a n  " o p t i m a l "  
c o m b i n a t i o n  o f  b o t h  c r i t e r i a  t h u s  a r i s e s .  
T h i s  p r o b l e m  i s  s u b j e c t  t o  f u r t h e r  i n v e s t i g a t i o n .  
Append ix :  P r o p e r t i e s  o f  t h e  G.'-ussian D i s t r i b u t i o n  F u n c t i o n  
Lemma. L e t  @ ( x )  be  t h e  G a u s s i a n  D i s t r i b u t i o n  F u n c t i o n ,  U ( x )  
i t s  i n v e r s e  a n d  
Then t h e  f o l l o w i n g  s t a t e m e n t s  a r e  v a l i d :  
a )  Q ( x )  -x f o r  x  < 0  
b )  x  - $ ~ ~ ( e " )  i s  s t r i c t l y  m o n o t o n o u s l y  i n c r e a s i n a  
on [0,m) 
P r o o f  
a )  F o r  R ( x ) ,  d e f i n e d  by e q .  ( 3 - 1 0 1 ,  t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  
1 R ( x )  < f o r  x  > 0  
t h e  p r o o f  i s  c o m p l e t e d .  i s  v a l i d  ( c f .  [6]  ) .  S i n c e  Q ( x )  = 
b )  X i t h  t h e  s u b s t i t u t i o n  x  = -Ln y  we h a v e  t o  show 
d  1 2  fi ( - ~ n  y  - 7~ ( y ) )  < o f o r  Y E ( O , ~ )  . 
As we h a v e  
1 t h e  i n e q u a l i t y  i s  v a l i d  f o r  y  2. T h e r e f o r e ,  i n  t h e  f o l l o w -  
i n g  we as sume  y < 1 . By s u b s t i t u t i n g  z = U(y)  we h a v e  z < 0 ,  
a n d  i t  r e m a i n s  t o  be  shown t h a t  
This inequality however, is equivalent to the inequality 
~ ( z )  > - z for z < 0 
which has been proven in a). 
C) AS x - fu2(e-') is monotonous we have either 
In the following we assume the second relation to be valid 
and show that this will lead to a contradiction. 
We iiave 
x - 2j-u2(e-X) 5 k for X E R  . 
There fore 
- X 
- J2(x - k ) >  U(e ) for x > Iln 2 
- - 
@(-J2(x - k) > e-' for x > !?,n 2 
- - 
This is equivalent to 
k 
> &(-J2(x - k ) )  for x 2 i?n 2 . e- - 
JTii 
This however, co-tradicts ( a ) .  
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